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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
SMITH v. STATE: DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO 
COMMENT ON THE CHALLENGES OF CROSS-RACIAL 
IDENTIFICATION AT CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN THE 
SOLE BASIS FOR CONVICTION IS EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY 
By: Bryan Davis 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that defense counsel is 
entitled to argue the fallibility of cross-racial identification in closing 
argument when the sole piece of evidence introduced against the 
defense is eyewitness testimony. Smith v. State, 388 Md. 468, 880 
A.2d 288 (2005). The Court found the victim's testimony regarding 
her enhanced ability to recognize faces had raised the issue of cross-
racial identification. As defense counsel is given the right to discuss 
all evidence raised during trial in closing argument, the trial court's 
denial of that right was an abuse of discretion and sufficient grounds to 
reverse the convictions ofboth defendants. /d. 
Christine Crandall ("Crandall"), a white female, was held up at 
gunpoint by two black males in an attempt to steal her car. A struggle 
ensued for her car keys, and Crandall called out to a neighbor to 
summon the police. The two men then walked away, but allegedly 
turned to face the victim before leaving the area. Approximately two 
weeks after the incident, Crandall viewed a series of photo arrays at 
the police station and identified James Smith ("Smith") and John 
Mack ("Mack") as the two men who had accosted her. With regard to 
Mack's photo, Crandall noted that despite a difference in hairstyle, 
"He looks very much like the man who had the gun and attempted to 
rob me." After viewing Smith's photo, Crandall wrote, "This looks 
like the man wearing the hat that attempted to rob me." Based on 
Crandall's identification, Smith and Mack were arrested and charged 
with a series of offenses. 
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, counsel for 
Smith and Mack jointly submitted a motion in limine requesting the 
jury be instructed on the challenges of cross-racial eyewitness 
identification. The judge denied the motion and precluded the parties 
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from raising the issue during opening statements. Defense counsel 
again attempted to raise the issue of cross-racial identification before 
closing arguments, but were denied permission to raise the issue in 
summation. The jury later found both defendants guilty of attempted 
robbery, assault, and attempted theft. 
Smith and Mackjointly appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland for review of the lower court's treatment of the cross-racial 
identification issue. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld 
the lower court's ruling and held the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification. 
Additionally, the Court held that the lower court correctly excluded 
any discussion of cross-racial identification from closing argument 
because no evidence had been produced at trial to suggest that cross-
racial identification was an issue. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland was asked to address whether 
the trial court erred either when it refused to give a jury instruction 
regarding the challenges of cross-racial identification or when it 
precluded the defense from discussing cross-racial identification in 
closing argument. Smith, 388 Md. at 477, 880 A.2d at 293. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland did not reach the jury instruction issue 
because it found sufficient grounds to reverse on the closing argument 
issue. !d. at 478, 880 A.2d at 293. 
The Court's opinion rested on the foundation that a criminal 
defendant, under both Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
will have the benefit of summation by defense counsel. !d. at 486, 880 
A.2d at 298 (citing Holmes v. State, 333 Md. 652, 658-59, 637 A.2d 
113, 116 (1994)). To determine whether this right was violated by the 
limits placed on defense counsel's closing argument during trial, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland utilized the parameters announced in 
Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404,326 A.2d 707 (1974). 
Wilhelm states, "As to summation, it is, as a general rule, within the 
range of legitimate argument for counsel to state and discuss the 
evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be 
drawn from the facts in evidence; and such comment or argument is 
afforded a wide range." !d. (quoting Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412-13, 326 
A.2d at 714). Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that during closing argument, counsel may make mention of ideas and 
concepts that would be considered common knowledge even if such 
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ideas have not been entered into evidence. Smith, 388 Md. at 487, 880 
A.2d 299 (citing Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728). 
The Court first looked to determine whether comment on cross-
racial identification would have been proper under the common-
knowledge prong. Smith, 388 Md. at 488, 880 A.2d at 300. In making 
that determination, the Court reviewed leading social research on the 
ability of witnesses to identify individuals of another race. !d. at 479-
85, 880 A.2d at 294-98. Experts note that while there seems to be 
agreement that certain races are impaired in their ability to identify 
members of another race, the evidence is far from conclusive. Id. at 
479, 880 A.2d at 294 (citing John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: 
The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
207, 211 (Spring 2001)). This lack of conclusive evidence about own-
race bias led the Court to find that difficulty in cross-racial 
identification is not a matter of common knowledge and therefore not 
subject to comment in closing argument. Smith at 488, 880 A.2d at 
300. 
The Court then examined whether comment on cross-racial 
identification was appropriate because it was either a discussion of 
evidence or a legitimate inference from facts established at trial. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland argued that Crandall's testimony 
had indeed raised the issue of cross-racial identification. Smith at 488-
89, 880 A.2d at 300. The witness testified that she was "extremely 
good with faces," and that she was "obsessed" with observing people 
and their postures as a result of her interest in art and painting people. 
Id. at 488, 880 A.2d at 300. 
Noting that eye-witness identification was the only significant 
evidence linking the defendants to the crime, the Court held that 
Crandall's testimony did raise the issue of cross-racial identification 
and should have opened the door for defense counsel to discuss the 
issue during closing argument. Id. at 489, 880 A.2d at 300. The denial 
of defense counsel's ability to comment on the issue was a reversible 
error. Id. 
Judge Harrell's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for 
creating a rule that gives judges and attorneys little guidance for 
implementation and enforcement. Id. at 497, 880 A.2d at 305. 
Additionally, the dissent voiced concern regarding the possibility that 
jurors may be misled by cross-racial identification arguments that are 
not based on conclusive research. Id. at 498, 880 A.2d at 305. 
In conclusion, as it seems the Court is willing to review cases in 
which discussion of cross-racial identification has been excluded, 
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defense attorneys should seize the moment and preserve the record 
whenever possible as it pertains to this issue. Conversely, prosecutors 
should be mindful that their cases may be derailed by the cross-racial 
identification issue when eyewitness testimony is the only evidence 
offered and the victim and defendant are of different races. Finally, it 
seems that the Court's decision in this case endorses defense counsel's 
use of inconclusive research about cross-racial identification whenever 
eyewitness testimony is a crucial component of a case. Courts will 
need to be vigilant to ensure that counsel does not mislead future juries 
about the strength of the research in an effort to invalidate otherwise 
reliable eyewitness identifications. 
